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The Meaning of Settler Realism 
(De)Mystifying Frontiers in the Postcolonial Historical Novel 
An unexpected moment occurs midway through Georg Lukács’ story of the 
development of literary realism in The Historical Novel. Having explained why Sir Walter 
Scott’s romances constitute modern literature’s first instance of true historical consciousness, 
Lukács turns his attention to those subsequent writers who supposedly developed, modified, 
or betrayed Scott’s legacy: Europeans like Balzac, Manzoni, and Tolstoy. His list includes 
one American, James Fenimore Cooper. Lukács praises Cooper’s 1820s “Leatherstocking” 
cycle for its “large and broad historical perspective” on North American colonialism, and 
argues that his novels reveal how “immediate economic contrasts and the moral ones arising 
from them grow organically out of everyday problems” – terms of high critical approbation 
for Lukács (Historical 64-65). Yet Lukács’ liking for Cooper is oddly ambivalent. Noting 
that on the frontier the contradiction between capitalism and indigenous life-ways “was posed 
far more brutally and directly by history itself” than in Europe (Historical 64), Lukács 
suggests that Cooper’s narrative is almost too accessible to be aesthetically good, declaring 
that “the directness and straightforwardness of the social contrast” leads to “an 
impoverishment of his artistic world” (Lukács Historical 64). Lukács thus implies that 
Cooper’s books are marred by their subject matter. The frontier is too obvious a subject for 
fiction, he suggests, its conflicts so readily apparent that they resist aesthetic manipulation 
(see Esty ‘Global’ 368). So Cooper achieves a “wonderful and tragic embodiment” of “one of 
the great contradictions of mankind’s journey of progress” (Historical 65), but cannot reach 
the heights climbed by Scott and Balzac; his colonial world is just not conducive to realist 
representation, populated as it is by characters who are “represented schematically, with 
superficial psychology and a monotonous and forced sense of humor” (Historical 64). If you 
want novels – truly realist ones – you have to look to the place where real history happens. 
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Or so Lukács seems to think. 
It would be easy to dismiss this attitude as the “manifest Eurocentrism” (Esty ‘Global’ 
366) it clearly is, a case of the “colonialist criticism” excoriated by figures – now far more 
famous than Lukács – like Chinua Achebe (‘Colonialist Criticism’). But I think it is more 
interesting to take Lukács’ argument seriously, and consider whether there is indeed 
something about settler-colonial literature that is at odds with conventional theories of 
realism. In this article I suggest that those theories can be broadened and complicated by a 
shift in focus to literary works that narrate, from colonists’ points of view, the occupation and 
repopulation of foreign lands. Described variously as the “settler’s plot” (Calder), “settler 
dreaming” (Turner ‘Settler Dreaming’), or “allegories of settlement” (Dalley), such narratives 
circulate in societies founded on the expropriation of indigenous peoples, as has occurred in, 
for example, the Americas, Africa, Australia and New Zealand – the latter two of which 
provide this article’s case studies. I argue that settler-colonial fiction constitutes a subset of 
the modern novel that inflects realist representation in theoretically-significant ways. 
Directing our attention to literatures of the frontier requires us to complicate our 
understanding of the links between the novel and historical consciousness. My principal 
claim is that while Lukács’ theories of realism are undoubtedly blinkered by Eurocentrism, 
they nonetheless offer a useful framework for exploring how formal-aesthetic variations in 
settler-colonial realism can be understood as differing responses to the representational 
tensions of frontier history. Moreover, I argue that one of Lukács’ critical distinctions – 
between reifying “naturalism” and critical “realism” – provides a tool for elucidating varying 
modes of settler-colonial historical consciousness. I illustrate these points through a 
comparison of the work of Eleanor Catton, from New Zealand, whose The Luminaries won 
the Booker Prize in 2013, and Rohan Wilson, of Australia, whose The Roving Party (2011) 
and To Name those Lost (2014) pose an alternative history of Tasmania. I show how the 
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specificities of settler colonialism require us to jettison linearity in narrating the history of the 
novel. By recognizing settler-colonial society as a distinctive form of modernity, we can 
reconceptualise literary realism as a mode of historical consciousness that is at once 
entangled with the aestheticization of social contradictions – as Lukács believed – and that 
develops according to globally differentiated temporalities. 
* 
The idea of a postcolonial “return to Lukács” (Sorenson 57) – the application of his 
ideas to the literature of non-metropolitan contexts – has engaged a number of critics recently 
(Lazarus; Sorenson; Andrade; Dalley). Any such transposition must grapple with the 
intrinsically Eurocentric substructure of Lukács’ work (Esty ‘Global’ 366), not to mention his 
normative commitment to concepts of totality (Cascardi) that sit uncomfortably with 
postcolonial and settler-colonial studies. As the example of Cooper shows, Lukács perceives 
realism to be an aesthetic response to advanced modernity; for him, it works best when 
“simple” (Historical 64) contradictions like those of the (raced) frontier have been absorbed 
and partly sublimated into class formations – but before the intoxication of high bourgeois 
civilization has taken hold. His theory is temporally progressive. For him, Cooper’s work is 
interesting but peripheral because the frontier represents a primitive stage of capitalist 
development, one already superseded elsewhere. This assumption is clearest in his 
characterisation of Cooper as a grand narrator of “mankind’s journey of progress” (Historical 
65). 
 Yet reframing Lukács from a postcolonial perspective is not as counterintuitive as it 
seems. His account of realism in The Historical Novel builds on the aesthetic first proposed in 
The Theory of the Novel (1920), which presents the genre as a formal compensation for the 
consciousness of totality lost as the world becomes more complex, globalized, and 
fragmented – processes that undoubtedly include the territorial extension of empire (Jameson 
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‘Modernism’). In this broken world, art manifests the gap between representation and reality. 
“[N]o longer a copy” of the real itself (Lukács Theory 37), the novel is a constructed 
alternative to it, “a created totality” (Lukács Theory 37) that manifests both the desire for, and 
impossibility of, understanding historical existence as a whole. Lukács subsequently defines 
the loss of totality as a product of reification and the mystification of consciousness that 
occurs when the commodity-form becomes universal. Capitalism’s “world of objects and 
relations between things” appears natural to those inside it, who see themselves governed by 
“invisible forces that generate their own power” and struggle to perceive them as effects of 
class oppression (Lukács History 87). Lukács defines realism as the mode of representation 
that demystifies this order by identifying connections and processes, penetrating the veil of 
reification to explicate underlying forces (Lukács ‘Balance’ 33). Lukács thus assigns to the 
novel the humanistic task of exploring how phenomena that seem natural are in fact the 
results of human activity. 
 This account becomes interesting with regard to settler colonialism at the point when 
Lukács argues that realism is not a universally-achievable aesthetic, but depends on a mode 
of consciousness only available to some positions within the capitalist totality. In History and 
Class Consciousness he explains that while reality “is—immediately—the same for 
bourgeoisie and proletariat,” only the latter can escape mystification (164-65). The bourgeois 
subject remains trapped by reification insofar as his or her social existence is premised on 
maintaining the dominance of commodity production; as a result, the bourgeois “makes of 
every historical object a variable monad which is denied any interaction with other—
similarly viewed—monads and which possesses characteristics that appear to be absolutely 
immutable essences” (Lukács History 153). The proletarian, by contrast, can gain access to 
“conscious[ness] of the social character of labour” (Lukács History 171), giving them 
knowledge of exploitation that, for the bourgeoisie, “would be tantamount to suicide” to 
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acknowledge (Lukács History 181). 
Is that idea not even more apt as a description of the colonial settler? For whom else 
could it be more ‘suicidal’ to acknowledge the material bases of subjective existence than for 
the settler, whose life is predicated not only on exploitation, but also on the expropriation and 
even extermination of native populations? Theorists of settler colonialism often deploy an 
imagery of mystification and reification that recalls, if implicitly, Lukács’ account. In the 
words of Lorenzo Veracini, for instance, settler colonialism is defined by how it “obscures 
the conditions of its own production” (14). Suggesting that settlers are traumatised by the 
violence that attends their seizure of land, he sees their narratives as shaped by obfuscation 
and denial – a need to hide from the brutality of history and deny the fact of past and ongoing 
indigenous presence (Veracini 75-77). Read in this way, settler narrative has been described 
as a mode of repressive “fantasy” that hides reality even from itself (Veracini 91). Other 
critics have used a corresponding language of “dream” (Hodge and Mishra) or “myth” 
(Curthoys) to characterise such narratives. It is only a short step from this approach to 
Lukács’ concepts of reification and demystifying critical realism. 
While this parallel is suggestive, though, it is important not to elide complexity in 
highlighting the correspondences between bourgeois and settler mystification. In this Lukács’ 
work is also useful in suggesting how theoretically-distinct possible responses to reification 
can emerge. In a distinction I argue has relevance for settler-colonial contexts as well, Lukács 
argues that the division between “proletarian” and “bourgeois” consciousness emerges 
aesthetically as a difference between two forms of novelistic representation: “realism” and 
“naturalism.” The latter corresponds to the reified perception of reality. Exemplified, 
supposedly, by Zola and James Joyce, naturalism accepts that the world is comprised of “pre-
existing and self-sufficient” objects connected only by natural laws; human beings are 
embedded within a system they have no role in creating, and must “conform to its laws 
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whether [they like] it or not” (Lukács History 89). Naturalism makes the aesthetic a self-
contained cosmos comprehensible on none but its own terms (Lukács ‘Modernism’ 39), a 
place where material conflicts are mystified by their displacement into symbolic systems, and 
freedom is an illusion. Lukács defines realism in contrast to this failure, suggesting it occurs 
when writers overcome the illusion to achieve awareness of the epic “wholeness” of life, 
integrating their knowledge of human existence into a totality that identifies how things that 
seem unrelated are actually manifestations of interconnected processes (Huhn 179; Lukács 
Writer 118). Realism shows history to be made by people, “no longer an enigmatic flux to 
which men [sic] and things are subjected,” but a comprehensible process that tends toward 
liberation – the proletarian revolution (Lukács History 185). As such, realism can be achieved 
only by those who occupy subject positions from which the social totality can be seen 
without terror. This includes bourgeois novelists in societies not yet confronted by insurgency 
from below – Britain and France before 1848, Russia slightly later – and those able to adopt 
the proletarian perspective (Lukács Writer 143). Only these groups, Lukács’ argues, can 
connect their subjective malaise to social contradictions, and produce literature that avoids 
the aesthetic temptations of mystification. 
 The argument that literary forms reflect access to knowledge of totality explains, for 
Lukács, the concrete aesthetic features likely to typify realist or naturalist art – forms which 
thus reflect modes of historical consciousness mediated by social positioning. Lukács’ core 
assumption is that the truth of world history is revealed by dialectics, in the materialist 
revision of Hegel proposed by Marx (Lukács History 177). For this reason, his account of 
realism stresses three key features: a vision of historical change as driven by contradictions 
between classes; individuality as a crystallization of socially typical qualities; and time as 
linear and progressive, tending toward the resolution of conflict in synthesis. In The 
Historical Novel he argues that these features emerge with Walter Scott, the key 
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representative of bourgeois consciousness during the period between the defeat of the 
aristocracy and rise of the proletariat (1789-1848). The realism of Scott’s novels lies in their 
distillation of the social conflicts of a period. Contradictions are represented (allegorically, I 
have argued (Dalley 13-41)) through the actions of typified characters, whose actions are at 
once concretely individual and exemplary of material forces at work (Lukács Historical 46). 
Lukács highlights Scott’s invention of the “middle-of-the-road” protagonist, who plays the 
role of Hegelian mediator by bringing the “extremes” of social conflict into “human 
relationship,” and whose synthesis of opposites at the end of the novel points in the direction 
of progress (Lukács Historical 36-39). For Lukács, these features are refined by subsequent 
realists like Balzac and Tolstoy, until their repudiation by aesthetic experimentalists like 
Flaubert, Zola, and Joyce – who reflect their socially-determined inability to comprehend the 
dialectical nature of history by producing narratives focused on atypical or eccentric 
characters, whose experiences do not typify social conflicts, and whose embeddedness in 
subjective temporalities obfuscates the march of time (Lukács Writer 144). Naturalism is 
regressive and ideologically complicit with capitalism, Lukács’ suggests, because it mystifies 
the fundamental humanistic truth that historical change is made by people – who therefore 
have the power to remake the future (Huhn 182-85). 
 As I have intimated, some have already sought to reshape Lukács’ theories for the 
postcolonial present. Fredric Jameson and Jed Esty have made the most important 
suggestions in this regard, exploring how nineteenth- and twentieth-century European 
literature can be read as a response to changes in the imagination of historical time that were 
themselves shaped by material processes that include the expansion of transnational 
capitalism and empire (Jameson Antinomies; Esty Shrinking). Putting empire back into the 
picture allows some of Lukács’ insights to stand while reshaping his normative judgements. 
Jameson, for instance, has proposed that European modernism – which Lukács despised as a 
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naturalist capitulation to reification – can be read instead as a complex attempt to grasp the 
capitalist totality at a moment when transnational empire has hidden the economic base 
overseas (‘Modernism’). Similarly, Esty has proposed that we can “retain some of [Lukács’] 
basic methodological and critical insights” while stripping away the presumption that 
everything after Tolstoy – let alone anything un-European – is unworthy of discussion (Esty 
‘Global’ 367). His Unseasonable Youth proposes a history of the novel shaped, like Lukács’, 
around the foundational contradictions of capitalism, but with empire understood as the key 
material context within which capitalism operates. This change in perspective problematizes 
notions of progress and unsettles linear temporalities. These works provide inspiration for my 
approach in this article. 
However, I argue that they can be taken further. Altering the focus of analysis to the 
settler-colonial frontier reveals new dimensions to literary realism not yet grasped by current 
criticism. The project of globalizing Lukács has, thus far, worked largely by expanding the 
scope of the dialectic, such that the “proletarian” space understood to be the privileged site of 
totalizing knowledge comes to include the colonized world (as Jameson attempts in “Third 
World Literature”). What this approach does not do is address the specificities of historical 
consciousness in settler societies – a context which cannot easily be folded into an enlarged 
theoretical perspective but which dislocates some of the theory’s formative assumptions. 
Settler colonialism can be shown to operate according to temporalities that disrupt the 
dialectical framework subtending Lukács’ model, problematizing his account of the realist 
novel’s development while opening new arenas in which to apply his critical distinctions. 
As Lorenzo Veracini has convincingly argued, settler colonialism is a distinctive 
socio-political formation that should not be conflated with either metropolitan or non-settler 
colonial structures; it is a “third” space different in its dynamics from either metropolitan or 
traditional peripheral zones and, as such, requires theorization in its own right (2). Current 
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accounts of settler colonialism identify at least three characteristics of such societies that are 
likely to cause tensions for a Lukácsian model of realist narrative. The first concerns a 
narratological paradox implied by the process of settlement itself. As Veracini argues, settlers 
are distinct from other migrants in that they carry sovereignty with them. Their origin 
narratives therefore must be at once linear – describing the transplantation of community 
from one place to another – and circular, insofar as the country being created is 
(symbolically) the same as the one that was left (Veracini 98-99). Stephen Turner describes 
the resulting paradox as a crisis of “colonial being,” for as much as settlers wish make 
themselves at home by affirming continuity between themselves and their environment, their 
identity as settlers depends on the necessary discontinuity of “before and after” their arrival 
(Turner ‘Being Colonial’ 59). The settler can never achieve symbolic unity with their home; 
that privilege belongs to the native, who, by definition, is present ab origine – from the 
beginning. Turner argues that this contradiction renders settler narrative irresolvable, in that 
every attempt to “mask, or bridge” the gap must eventually reveal itself to be “an illusory 
continuity” (Turner ‘Being Colonial’ 58-59; see also Calder; Dalley 45-94). Lukács’ claim, in 
his brief reading of Cooper, that settler realism ends with “the Indians’ moral disintegration” 
and their replacement by colonists (Historical 64) ignores this paradox and reflects the failure 
of his progressivism to account for frontier narrative forms. Turner’s model suggests that on 
the contrary the native will insistently return as a marker of the foundational contradictions of 
settler narrative. As a bearer of the belonging the settler cannot possess, the native must be 
invoked and defeated again and again, as the narratological tension between linearity and 
circularity prevents the resolution that Lukács’ dialectical model requires. 
The second area of tension lies in the nature of the conflict settler colonialism entails. 
For Lukács, bourgeois realism is progressivist insofar as the past is perceived to be a 
successive chain of contradictions that are resolved in the manner of Hegelian dialectics. 
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Thus in Scott’s Waverley the clash between Highland society and English mercantilism is 
resolved with a synthesis that breaks the economic and political power of the Scots but 
preserves their folk culture (Historical 37) – and, we might add, crucially enlists them as 
proletarianized labourers. This makes realism a way to exhibit historical continuity by 
framing the past as “the prehistory of the present” (Lukács Historical 53). Settler colonialism, 
however, presents a scene in which the key social contradiction – between settler and 
indigene – is not amenable to dialectical synthesis. On the contrary, settlement constructs a 
reified social order par excellence, in which the material distinction between exploiter and 
exploited is symbolically coded as the fixity of race. In Frantz Fanon’s famous description, 
the “[settler] colonial world is […] compartmentalized,” divided between sectors that “follow 
the dictates of mutual exclusion” (Fanon 3-4). Unlike the contradictions of Scott or Balzac 
that resolve in the synthesis of national communities (see Arac), settler and native “confront 
each other, but not in the service of a higher unity” (Fanon 4). The relationship is, in abstract 
terms (and notwithstanding empirical variations to the underlying structure), predicated on 
the displacement and/or destruction of one society by another, not on the synthesis of 
opposing forces. Settler colonialism is defined by what Patrick Wolfe describes as a 
genocidal “logic of elimination” (Wolfe ‘Elimination’ 387), a “zero-sum” pattern that means 
“settler societies, for all their internal complexities,” and regardless of individuals’ wishes, 
“uniformly require the elimination of Native alternatives” (Wolfe ‘Binarism’ 257). This logic 
is incommensurable with the progressivist model for it entails no resolution but the 
destruction of one group by the other – which itself, like a racial type immune to 
miscegenation, remains ideally unchanged. 
This structure produces the final, temporal difference between settler-colonialism and 
Lukács’ model. As Wolfe puts it, “invasion is a structure not an event” – “elimination” is the 
“organising principle” of settler colonies and not a “one-off (and superseded) occurrence” 
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(Wolfe ‘Structure’ 102-3). In other words, because the settler-colonial relation does not 
resolve through synthesis, its foundational logic as a structural binary persists as long as 
settlement is incomplete. Since indigenous peoples have almost always survived the settler 
onslaught, this means, in practical terms, forever. It is not simply that settler societies are still 
colonized. The compartmentalized form of settler-colonial relations means the frontier “is a 
continuous process” (Gall 99), not a finished event; it is not the “prehistory” of contemporary 
society (Lukács Historical 53) but its underlying truth. For this reason we can say that settler 
colonies are places where “time does not pass” (Baucom 24). Narratives predicated on the 
pastness of the past cannot be adequate to this social formation, for they would mystify the 
fact that regardless of appearances, the frontier is still with us today. 
Settler colonialism thus rests on a foundation that puts it at odds with the progressive 
historicism underpinning European literary development according to Lukács. Critics have 
reinforced this view by positing settler narrative as a mode of disavowal, one that turns away 
from the brutal realities of the frontier to provide post-settler communities with sanitised 
origins (Veracini; Hodge and Mishra). The fact that the settler colony is not imaginatively 
progressive means there can be no mediation in which the settler discovers his or her futurist 
role – as there is, Lukács argues, in the bourgeois realist phase. Rather, the settler avoids 
confronting the truth of his or her existence, either by projecting social contradictions onto 
the non-human environment – which becomes a proxy for the absent native (Curthoys; 
Ashcroft) – or by erecting a “screen memory” of other, non-existentially troubling conflicts 
(Veracini 90). Either way, what is lost in settler narrative is the real of its material 
foundation. 
That said, I suggest that Lukács can offer ways to understand variations within this 
subgenre. If we follow Esty and “turn Lukács against Lukács” (‘Global’ 366), we might 
conceptualize setter-colonial novels not only as a form predicated on denial of the real, but 
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also, potentially, on the recovery of distinctive forms of critical realism. In what follows, I 
suggest that if settler-colonial narratives cannot be predicated on the discovery of progressive 
temporality through conflict, they might nonetheless enact at least two other possible forms 
of non-progressive historicism. On the one hand, they might embrace settler ideology, deny 
or naturalise colonial conquest, and try to construct a world reconciled to the absence of time. 
On the other, they might seek to face the traumatic real of colonialism and seek out its 
existence, not only as a semi-forgotten past but also as an ongoing structural effect. If we put 
aside Lukács’ normative commitment to nineteenth-century forms, we might understand 
these alternatives via his distinction between naturalism and realism. Insofar as the former 
reproduces dominant ideology, it makes historical processes natural and hence unchangeable. 
Insofar as the latter sets itself the archaeological task of unearthing contradictions and 
opposing the reification of settlement, it achieves a kind of realism – as unexpected as its 
forms might be. The remainder of this paper tests that hypothesis, suggesting that we find 
examples of settler naturalism and realism in contemporary historical novels from New 
Zealand and Australia. If this argument is found to be plausible, it will stand as a sign that 
settler-colonial fiction functions in a complex tension with other modes of literary realism, 
requiring us to find new ways to understand how the novel develops according to complex, 
contradictory, and uneven temporalities. 
* 
The Luminaries presents a formally- and thematically-complex engagement with 
colonial settlement in New Zealand. Centred on the West Coast gold rushes of the 1860s, it 
invokes the period James Belich calls “explosive colonisation,” when a conjunction of 
material and ideological factors provoked mass migration and wholesale “societal 
reproduction” in the colony (Belich Replenishing 182). The novel focuses on a quest to 
identify the true owner of gold discovered in a murdered settler’s cabin. Its 800 pages trace 
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this fortune through the possession of numerous characters, linking them in a pattern that 
spans the colony’s social parameters, from the institutional power of the local Member of 
Parliament, to bankers, businessmen, brothel-owners, prostitutes, indentured Chinese 
labourers, and dispossessed Māori. In so doing, The Luminaries displays virtuosic formal 
control, matching nineteenth-century stylistic features to a non-linear narrative that evokes 
twentieth-century modernism. 
Catton’s ideological risks equal her aesthetic ones: her chosen period is fraught for 
contemporary New Zealanders. Since the mid-1970s frontier history has been a cause of 
public disputation, as Māori political movements have sought redress for colonisation, and 
Pakeha (white settlers) have struggled with the resulting threat to their legitimacy (see 
Orange). The 1860s are central to that contention, as a period marked by armed resistance 
from some Māori and a panicked, violent backlash by British and settler forces (Belich 
Wars). From the 1990s a neo-colonial brand of Pakeha nationalism has emerged, which seeks 
to ignore, minimise, or rationalise frontier injustice, and to dismiss Māori critiques by 
denying the relevance of the past (Turner ‘Settlement as Forgetting’ 21-23; Williams). As 
recently as 2014, the conservative Prime Minister John Key demonstrated the processes of 
disavowal at work, declaring that doubts about the legitimacy of colonial sovereignty in New 
Zealand were irrelevant because the country was “settled peacefully,” by colonists who 
brought “a lot of skills and a lot of capital” (‘Settled Peacefully’). The frontier haunts the 
political imaginary, troubling the beneficiaries of dispossession who must “depopulate the 
country of indigenous peoples in representations and especially in recollections,” if they are 
to retain their sense of self as settled in transplanted sovereignty (Veracini 82). 
 Read against this context, Catton’s aesthetic experimentalism is striking in its 
idiosyncratic approach. The novel places secular history in dialogue with astrology, asking 
readers to understand how these incompatible discourses organize her work formally. The 
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“Note to the Reader” with which Catton opens assures that “stellar and planetary positions in 
this book” have been “determined astronomically” (Luminaries ix), a theme that continues in 
the “character chart,” which groups the twenty central figures according to their status as 
“stellar”, “planetary”, or “terra firma,” and which assigns each star-character a “related 
house” and each planet-character a “related influence” (xi). The chapter structure reinforces 
this puzzle-form. It is divided into twelve sections (repeating the numerical form of the 
zodiac), of which each is shorter than the one before, waning (like the moon) from 360 pages 
in Part I to 4 pages in Part XII. Form is here matched by temporality: each chapter is set 
during a single day – with flashbacks – and opens with an astrological diagram mapping 
planetary positions against the zodiac. The chart associates signs with characters, indicating, 
for instance, that Thomas Balfour equates to Sagittarius, Aubert Gascoigne to Capricorn, and 
so on. Each section advances consistently by one month, from January to December, while 
the annual setting varies, so that Parts I-III cover January-March 1866, Part IV alternates 
between April 1865 and 1866, and Parts V-XII run from May-December 1865. This pattern 
blends linear progression through the months with circularity, as we return at the end to 
events that precipitated the beginning. 
Catton’s insistent focus on structures both hidden and apparent recalls Lukács’ 
definition of realism as representation that looks beneath “whatever manifests itself 
immediately and on the surface” (‘Balance’ 33). The Luminaries plays with distinctions 
between appearance and reality. Catton alludes to Stendhal’s famous description of the realist 
novel as “a mirror carried along a high road” (Stendhal vol. 2 166), declaring the present to 
be “an age of mirrors” (ix), and, several times, presenting images that make sense only if 
understood as reflected: for example, “sunrise over the coastline” (478, 795) in a place – 
Hokitika – where the sun actually sets over the sea. Invitations to find patterns are dispersed 
throughout the text. The novel’s opening line highlights the gap between apparent 
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randomness and actual structure in its association of characters and setting: “The twelve men 
congregated in the smoking room of the Crown Hotel gave the impression of a party 
accidentally met” (3; emphasis added). Purposelessness resolves into metaphorical resonance 
when we realize the room’s layout corresponds to a zodiac, centred on the “sun” (fireplace) 
and ringed by a circle of immobile figures, of whom half are made invisible by the observer’s 
“horizon” of sight: “The armchair in which [Moody] was sitting faced the hearth, and so 
nearly half of the men in the room were behind him, sitting or standing at their various sham 
pursuits” (26). Reinforcing this hermeneutic injunction, the word “design” recurs 
numerously, and its multiple significations – “pattern,” “intention,” “conspiracy” – highlight 
the fact that, as Lukács says of society broadly, hidden determinants connect seemingly 
random phenomena (‘Balance’ 31-2). Or, as Moody reflects, “There had to be a better 
explanation for all of this than merely the correlative accident of circumstance” (350). 
Reading The Luminaries well therefore means discerning its hidden pattern. If this 
split between surface and structure betrays an impulse toward realism, however, I argue that 
the actual form of that substrate creates a novel complicit with settler-colonial ideology. The 
Luminaries is organized by two interlocking frames, one of which is contained within, and 
determined by, the other — a “Sphere within a Sphere,” to use the title of Part I (1). This 
structure allows Catton to stabilize the tensions between the non-progressive temporality of 
the frontier and the settlers’ need to separate past from present. On my reading, this pattern 
reifies colonial history, invoking the frontier only to naturalize it through a symbolic 
structure that makes the past safe for consumption. 
The first part of this interlocking pattern is comprised of a progressivist account of 
settler history. This narrative frames colonial development according to the “palindrome” 
form that for Veracini is typical of settler-colonial fantasies (100-101). Catton’s Hokitika is a 
frontier town expanding rapidly as fortune-hunters congregate from around the world. She 
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shows how in 1865-6, the “extractive” phase of development focused on gold (Belich, 
Replenishing 190-92) is giving way to capital investment, a shift that marks both losses and 
gains. Westland is soon to be connected by road to Christchurch, and the chief-gaoler George 
Shepard wants to build a new prison before Alistair Lauderbeck, newly elected to Parliament, 
can divert the funds elsewhere. As Shepard makes clear, the prison is a symbol of Hokitika’s 
transitional state, poised between historical phases he defines as “savage” and “civil”. The 
initial gold rush was characterised by the conventions of “digger’s law,” in which each 
prospector enforced his rights through violence (133-34). This tips over into the period of 
capital accumulation when “prospectors give way to dams and dredges and company mines,” 
a phase that requires a new “code of justice” to be enforced by “civilized men” (133-34). This 
account presents the colony as a liminal zone, poised in a “twilight” of change “between the 
old world and the new” (135) – a moment when norms are in flux and social advancement is 
possible. 
The material precondition of transformation in this phase is gold, an object that 
introduces the possibility of sudden, almost messianic, redemption into the linear pattern of 
savage-to-civil time. Catton’s colonists dream of the strike that would let them return wealthy 
to Britain; as Shepard puts it, “A homeward bounder [huge discovery] is a chance for total 
reinvention” – a “promise [not] offered in the civil world” (144-45). The paradox of the 
frontier is thus that great rewards are made possible by social fluidity. It is a space at once 
connected to the progressivist structures of capitalist accumulation, and magically exempt 
from the strictures of class. Catton reflects this paradox by narrating how a single homeward-
bounder, discovered by an alcoholic, broken-down settler, passes fortuitously from hand to 
hand, changing each character who touches it. The transformative implications of this process 
mean that gold is not riches or currency but fortune, a word that conflates ideas of wealth, 
chance and destiny (488-89). At the same time, gold is the mundane lubricant of economic 
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development, a process that will eventually make Hokitika a “shadow of the British Isles” 
(10), where the “muck and hazard” (11) of the frontier have been foreclosed. This pattern 
imprints historical time with the futurity of capital accumulation. As one character declares, 
“Gold was like all capital in that it had no memory: its drift was always onward, away from 
the past” (104). 
To this extent, the historical structure of The Luminaries replicates the progressivist 
form equated by Lukács with realism – a form that also subtends settler-colonial fantasies of 
social reproduction (Veracini 98-99). The Luminaries is further complicated, however, by the 
existence of the second framework provided by the astrological schema, which encompasses 
and determines the historical pattern. This second framework is the ultimate source of 
causation in the narrative, and hence occupies the position of the real for its imagined world: 
a fact that I argue secures the novel’s settler-colonial naturalism. As mentioned, each 
individual corresponds to a star sign or planet, associations that shape the development of the 
novel beyond material factors. Each character’s personality derives from his or her 
astrological identity. For example, Benjamin Lowenthal, a Jewish newspaper proprietor, 
corresponds to Gemini, a fact that explains his personality as a man “fated to see the inherent 
duality in all things” (198; compare Snodgrass 109). Characters fall in love because the stars 
demand it – as in the case of Edgar Clinch, who, as the embodiment of Cancer, must 
“answers to both the element of water and to the moon” (Snodgrass 121-22), and does so by 
desiring the novel’s lunar avatar, Anna Wetherill (“a reflected darkness, just as she was a 
borrowed light” (225)). Astrology likewise determines conflict. Clinch loathes Aubert 
Gascoigne (Capricorn) for reasons he cannot explain, but which make sense when we see that 
these characters – “two fighting dogs across a pit” (246) – stand directly opposed on the 
astrological chart. It is only when we grasp this pattern that the novel’s twists and turns make 
sense; without it, relations among characters, and the resulting plot, seem arbitrary. 
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It is crucial to realize that this allegorical structure exists as an understanding between 
narrator and reader, and does not derive from the consciousness of any character. No figure in 
The Luminaries ever discusses astrology, and the star charts are without diegetic justification. 
The novel is not an analysis of how nineteenth-century prospectors imagined their world; 
rather, astrology offers a metaphorical key to events. Once this is realized, interactions 
become comprehensible as cosmological operations before which individual motivations 
shrink to irrelevance. “Conjunctions” (a recurrent term) between characters are decided by 
the alignment of stars and planets, creating patterns that seem to accord with the demands of 
realist plausibility but which are actually astronomically determined. Even contradictions that 
seem historical – such as the contest between Shepard and Lauderbeck over development 
projects – actually serve this astrological intent: in this case, marking the contest for 
dominance between Saturn (Shepard) and Jupiter (Lauderbeck), whose symbolic identities as 
successive rulers of the heavens recode the novel’s setting “between the old world and the 
new” (135) in mythological, rather than historical, terms.  
The primacy of astrology over history can be seen how the former resolves 
contradictions the latter cannot. For example, Catton’s characters can appear improbable 
when read with the assumption that their personalities reflect circumstance or culture. The 
most important case concerns Te Rau Tauwhare, the novel’s only Māori character. At the 
level of the historical framework, he appears as a proto-nationalist or anti-colonialist, a man 
resentful of the expropriation of his people’s land. Invoking the frontier as an ongoing 
structure, he perceives the West Coast gold rushes as a “patent theft” built on the 
foundational crime of occupation (98). Yet his feelings do not stop him befriending Crosbie 
Wells, a settler who occupies that stolen land and lives off its resources (99). Tauwhare call 
Wells his “kindred spirit” (100), at the same time as he affirms Wells’ valley to be “his own” 
and reacts with outrage “whenever any tract of Te Tai Poutini land was bought for profit 
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rather than for use” (369). The historical narrative cannot explain this inconsistency, but the 
astrological one can: Tauwhare corresponds to Taurus in Catton’s schema, meaning that, as 
an earth sign, his love for “terra firma” – Wells himself – is cosmically predetermined. 
As this example shows, the astrological schema renders The Luminaries’ historical 
frame secondary to the whole. Insofar as it is the latter that bears the narrative’s awareness of 
colonial expropriation, we can conclude that Catton invokes the frontier only to make it 
structurally irrelevant by subsuming it within a larger, determining cosmological pattern. 
Indeed, Catton’s astrology renders notions of human agency, whether individual or collective, 
ironic in general. Characters believe themselves to be making decisions, but their very role in 
the story waxes and wanes not according to their acts but the mathematical association of 
stars and planets. Astrology thus functions as a source of ironic distance. Characters believe 
themselves to possess self-understanding and agency, but readers – better informed of how 
their world operates – see their confidence is misplaced. The novel instead affirms “the vast 
and knowing influence of the infinite sky” (ix) – an impersonal, anti-humanist force against 
which individual subjects, and their conflicts, shrink to irrelevance. 
 To this extent, The Luminaries can be seen as a specifically settler-colonial instance 
of reified consciousness. As Lukács describes, reification produces a social world from which 
human activity appears to have been drained, one governed by impersonal laws that, like 
movements in the sky, “confront [the individual] as invisible forces that generate their own 
power” (History 87). To read this novel is to find a narrative of expropriation, mass 
settlement, and economic development – plotted according to a progressivist temporality that 
is an alibi of settler colonialism – subsumed within an anti-humanist framework without 
which nothing would cohere. Lukács’ account of reification describes the resulting world 
perfectly: “reality disintegrates into a multitude of irrational facts and over these a network of 
purely formal ‘laws’ emptied of content is then cast” (History 155). To this extent, Catton’s 
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“avant-garde” (McAlpine) fiction is aligned with the settler-colonial imaginary, reproducing 
its palindromic form within a self-contained cosmos governed by irresistible laws. 
Catton’s naturalism thus instantiates, as form, colonialist ideology. As Veracini 
observes, “settler projects are recurrently born in a perception of “emptiness”” (82), and this 
is a key outcome of The Luminaries’ draining of its imagined world of agency. In an essay 
appended to the American edition of the novel Catton depopulates the New Zealand 
landscape, describing the South Island as a place of “sublime natural beauty” that resists 
description because it is unshaped by human activity (‘Land of the Long White Cloud’ 11). 
The novel itself reflects the narrative incoherence this erasure provokes when it implies that 
New Zealand’s land was at once uninhabited by Māori, and occupied by Pakeha with their 
consent. Not only does Tauwhare legitimize Wells’ settlement through his metaphorical 
kindship, he cheerfully helps surveyors map his ancestral country for sale (369). Perhaps 
what is most striking is the extent to which The Luminaries’ naturalism aligns with Pakeha 
nationalism by splitting past and present – a division that, as conservative politicians argue 
(see Brash), makes historical injustice irrelevant to today. This is a necessary product of the 
astrological schema, for if character and event are products of cosmic design, and human 
agency is an illusion, then historical processes have no role in shaping life. It is meaningless, 
on those terms, to suggest that social inequities have historical roots, or that the frontier might 
persist not as a memory but as a wound in the communal self. If “History is what hurts,” 
astrology is anaesthetic for the novel-form (Jameson Political 102). 
* 
In this way we can see a distinctive kind of aesthetic naturalism emerging from the 
novel’s encounter with settler colonialism. What, then, might a critical realism of the frontier 
look like? A form logically implied by the account above would involve resisting the 
naturalization of settler-colonial progressivism, while simultaneously affirming the humanist 
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foundation of historical change. I suggest an example of such form can be found in the work 
of the Australian historical novelist Rohan Wilson, whose two novels of Tasmanian 
settlement differ from The Luminaries substantially. Wilson’s fiction enacts the core project 
of Lukácsian realism by unearthing the determinants of change. But since the change in 
question concerns frontier conflict, they do not replicate the aesthetic norms of metropolitan 
realism but respond to the specific representational pressures of that context. This settler-
colonial realism is resolutely anti-progressivist, mapping the fissure in time torn by the 
frontier and tracing the permutations of the settler-indigene binary as it returns in modified 
forms. Settler realism, this analysis reveals, involves a rigorous commitment to 
demystification and a willingness to enter the nightmare world of settler colonialism, where 
time does not – and cannot be allowed to – pass. 
The Roving Party (2011) and To Name Those Lost (2014) narrate a forty-year period 
of colonialism in Van Diemen’s Land/Tasmania. Remembered as one of the bloodiest 
frontiers of the British Empire, Tasmania became a key battleground of Australia’s “history 
wars” of the 1990s and 2000s (see MacIntyre and Clark) – a political context Wilson explains 
in a recent interview (Wilson and Dalley). The former novel is set during the final stages of 
the “Black War,” the struggle for control of the island between white settlers (free and 
convicts) and Aboriginal Tasmanians. It centres on a series of military expeditions led by 
John Batman, key opponent of Aboriginal resistance and later founder of Melbourne. For 
those involved in this war, the absolute nature of the frontier, inscribed as a racial hierarchy, 
goes without saying: as the young convict Thomas Toosey learns, “You cant [sic] murder a 
black […] any more than you can murder a cat” (Roving 99). To Name Those Lost returns to 
this character forty years later, when the Aboriginal population has been decimated and men 
like Toosey bear a legacy of violence that puts them at odds with the colony they helped 
establish. Toosey’s life cuts across the linear transition of colonial development. His failure 
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to adjust to settled society (when the novel opens he is a recovering alcoholic who has just 
robbed a friend, severely disfiguring a young woman in the process) reflects the ongoing 
consequences of the colony’s originating forms, even when the racial struggle itself seems to 
have ended. 
What is striking is the extent to which Wilson draws connections between the two 
novels, positioning the second as a kind of repetition or recapitulation of the first. Both, 
significantly, have the same plot structure, being centred on hunts in which the major 
characters adopt the roles of pursuer and pursued. In The Roving Party, Batman organises 
two expeditions to chase a band of Aboriginal warriors led by Manalargena, a charismatic 
leader determined to resist dispossession. Within this struggle is a personal battle in which 
Batman’s assistant Black Bill – an Indigenous Tasmanian raised by settlers – is asked by 
Manalargena to join him, but instead sides with the colonists. In To Name Those Lost the 
pursuit is likewise doubled. Toosey is hunted by Fitheal Flynn, an ex-convict turned cattle 
farmer from whom he has stolen two hundred pounds, while himself seeking his motherless 
son, a boy lost in the town of Launceston.  The symbolic resonance of this shared structure is 
suggested by a parable told by Manalargena: 
There was two brother you see. They live near a river them brother. They catch plenty 
crayfish in river. […] Hunter come to the river. He is hungry hunter you see. He want 
crayfish. He see them brother eating crayfish, singing song. He want crayfish too. He 
bring up spear. […] But them brother they scared you see. They scared and they run. 
They run and they change. They change to wallaby and they jump. […] So hunter he 
change too. He run and he change to that wallaby and he jump. Now three wallaby 
jump near river. They eat grass. They forget the crayfish. […] Three wallaby near the 
river you see. Not two and one but three. Them brother lost, you understand. […] 
Them all lost. All same you see. (Roving 7-8) 
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Manalargena’s story reveals how pursuit creates differentiation – between the two brothers 
who control resources, and the hunter who wants it – and that this distinction conveys identity 
and hence humanity on those involved. In addition to the story’s diegetic function, as a 
device to convince Bill to side with ‘his people’ against the colonists, it also reflects the 
underlying structure of Wilson’s hunt-narratives, which rely upon a foundational separation 
between those who possess and dispossess. Manalargena implies that to forget such 
distinctions is to lose sight of reality and, to that extent, to lose oneself. Read in this light, 
Wilson commits his novels to acknowledging the reality of the frontier as the defining 
structure of settler colonialism, and to resisting the urge to forget or mystify this foundational 
distinction. 
Where Wilson’s novels differ is in the object of desire that motivates each pursuit – a 
shift that reveals how the frontier, readily comprehensible in the initial phase of settlement, 
becomes mystified as time goes by. In The Roving Party the war’s aim is clear: to control the 
island’s farmland. The novel is replete with imagery highlighting the land’s contested status, 
signs that to Bill – who straddles settler and Aboriginal societies – are ever-present. Bill 
observes of Batman’s property that “to [the white settlers’] eyes the whole of Kingston farm 
was a swath of order hacked out of chaos, a stamp of authority hammered into Van Diemen’s 
Land” (Roving 26). But to him are apparent “the ancient constructions of the 
Plindermairhemener, the precisely burned plains carved over generations to advantage the 
hunter, the lands called up anew with every footfall” (Roving 26). Contradictory marks of 
ownership recur as the rovers find trees “carved over with bisected circles, detailings of the 
moon and sun, images of snakes and roo” – “finely wrought icons” of possession that, after 
the party attacks an Aboriginal camp, are overlaid by a survivor’s “bloody handprint” 
(Roving 88). The war’s stakes are clear, for Batman has occupied “the best [land] for his 
sheep,” forcing the clans onto “loose uneven soil” that provides no food (Roving 54). Wilson 
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thereby foregrounds the historical argument that frontier violence was the inevitable outcome 
of the conflict over farmland (compare Barta; Boyce 186-206). Batman’s willingness to 
“shoot every last black hide on this mountain” (Roving 78) is less a statement of bloodlust 
than a clear-eyed description of the structural logic of settler colonialism.  
By the 1870s and To Name Those Lost the land has been secured, making its function 
at the base of social conflict harder to discern. The narrative nonetheless engages in this 
demystifying task by showing how the hunt at its centre concerns wealth produced from 
colonised land. The stolen two hundred pounds belong to Flynn, a former convict who earned 
them farming the very region pacified by Toosey and his comrades in The Roving Party. 
Toosey exchanges the notes for gold coins at the Launceston Bank, a building that exhibits in 
“monumental” style “the spirit of wealth taken hold in the colony” (Lost 99), making it a 
visible mark of the economic development that has followed pacification. Toosey hides the 
gold, hoping to buy secret passage with his son William to Melbourne, and there start a new 
life free of his convict past (Lost 266). At every step, though, he meets rival claimants willing 
to steal or kill for the money. Wilson thus foregrounds gold’s status as currency, an abstract 
bearer of value that – in keeping with the colony’s agricultural foundation – derives from the 
combination of land and labour, and functions to transfer that value. The capitalist 
infrastructure recurs in Wilson’s characterisation of Toosey as “a ticket-of-leavesman free to 
sell his labour” (Lost 205), and in a scene in which Toosey counts the money in “a copse of 
long-ago burnt gums that wore a green fur of regrowth” – unburned forest signalling, in the 
Australian context, the absence of Indigenous Tasmanians who would normally have tended 
the land with fire (Lost 56). Moreover, by contextualising the “monumental” Launceston 
Bank, where agricultural profits are exchanged, within a town of “telegraph lines […] 
canned-goods emporiums and coffee palaces” (Lost 99), Wilson reveals how visible markers 
of economic modernity derive from the colony’s agricultural base, and thence from the 
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dispossession depicted in The Roving Party. When Toosey presents his notes for exchange 
they are “stained with blood” – blood of the men he fights for them, but also, it is implied, of 
the Aborigines he helped kill under Batman’s command (Lost 100). 
In this way, Wilson echoes Catton in presenting gold as the engine of individual 
transformation. Yet by linking his novels Wilson emphasises that gold is not a magic 
talisman, but a signifier of social relations, bearing the marks of conflict and domination. 
This focus on the material origins of value marks the distance between Wilson’s and Catton’s 
approaches. I noted above the claim – voiced by Tauwhare, of all people – that gold has “no 
memory” (Luminaries 104), and indeed Catton’s byzantine plot is dissimilar to Wilson’s in 
obfuscating the links between Wells’ fortune and colonial expropriation. Her discussion of 
unfair land sales refers to Poutini Ngai Tahu territory – “the entire western coast of the South 
Island” (98) – but her gold originates in Central Otago (676), territory to which Tauwhare has 
no claim. In Catton’s world, “gold in a river does not belong to anyone; nor does it belong to 
the river” (324), implying that it is the diggers’ good luck, rather than their participation in a 
colonial economy, that brings “fortune” into existence. The Luminaries makes the colony a 
place where value circulates apolitically, without reference to the structural inequalities 
apparent in Wilson’s work. 
Wilson’s novels, by contrast, open up the social contradictions of nineteenth-century 
Tasmania to explore the impact of colonialism on characters across class and race divides. To 
this extent, his work’s specificity as a settler-colonial variant of realism becomes apparent. 
The character structure of The Roving Party maps onto Lukács’ “classical historical novel” 
(Lukács 63) insofar as it is focalised by Black Bill. He straddles the division between settler 
and Aboriginal societies and, as a “middle-of-the-road” figure (Lukács Historical 37), brings 
Batman and Manalargena, “whose clash expresses artistically a great crisis in society, into 
contact with one another” (Lukács Historical 36). But where Lukács sees the middling 
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protagonist as a mechanism of dialectical synthesis, Wilson refuses the temptation of 
progressive resolution. It becomes increasingly clear that Black Bill’s position is untenable; 
in the colony, one is either settler or native, and as a member of Batman’s party, Bill “aint no 
part athat [Indigenous society] no more” (Roving 168). The narrative forecloses on the 
possibility of a biological future for Bill when his son dies shortly after birth, having been 
cursed by Manalargena in revenge for Bill’s role in the war. Bill and his wife Katherine then 
track Manalargena, intending to kill him, but the novel’s climactic fight ends without 
conclusion; both men are wounded but survive. The allegorical solution that would have been 
implied had Bill defeated Manalargena – that a modified Indigeneity might persist within 
colonialism – is thus prevented from defeating the radical, if unachievable, anticolonial 
alternative. In this way Wilson rejects the option presented by Lukács’ model, keeping the 
foundational contradiction open by refusing any future that is a synthetic development of the 
present. 
That future instead appears as To Name Those Lost, a novel that signals the 
persistence of colonial contradictions in new forms through a narrative in which the primary 
conflict – between Toosey and Flynn – is peripheral to, rather than representative of, the 
social divide. Their struggle takes place against the background of unrest provoked when the 
government levies citizens to bail out a railway company. Flynn seizes the opportunity of 
rioting to attack Toosey, and their fight — which leaves the former dead and the latter injured 
and defenceless when Flynn’s daughter Caislyn comes for revenge — happens as the chaos 
takes on the contours of a lower-class rebellion (Lost 150-51, 187-96). This expresses how 
the dynamics of social inequality have shifted. If race is the marker of the frontier in the late 
1820s – as the battle to defeat the Aborigines binds free and unfree whites into an alliance of 
shared interests – then the defeat of the Indigenous population by the 1870s sees class 
distinctions re-emerge. In this context, Toosey’s personal struggle for freedom no longer 
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coincides with the core contradictions of colonial society – a change signalled by his move to 
the periphery of the conflict. 
In other words, To Name Those Lost is shaped by the dehiscence of plot and social 
contradiction, a formal effect that manifests the fact that while the frontier (as an emblem of 
material struggle for land) remains fundamental, it is no longer readily accessible to the 
consciousness of colonial subjects. The process of mystification is underway, and only a 
rigorous attention to ongoing colonial relations – achieved here by Wilson’s commitment to 
trace the origins of settler wealth – can avoid the fall into naturalism. This effect suggests a 
new way to think of the paradox raised above, in which Lukács implies vis-a-vis Cooper that 
settler colonialism is too obvious a subject for sophisticated realism. Wilson’s novels suggest 
that settler realism is indeed more accessible (if not better or worse) when the frontier is 
drawn by race. Subsequent periods require an almost archaeological commitment to tracing 
the contours of buried structures. This effort is revealed by the shift in characterisation in To 
Name Those Lost, a sign of the modulation of conflict into class forms and the attending 
increase in aesthetic difficulty. 
The resulting work nonetheless succeeds in dissolving settler-colonial progressivism 
in a temporality that I argue is realist insofar as it abandons the forms praised as such by 
Lukács. Like The Roving Party, To Name Those Lost embodies its putative telos in the figure 
of the son, to whom Toosey wishes to give his gold and resettle in Melbourne. This 
conclusion would represent the triumph of mystification, for Toosey’s entire purpose in 
relocating is to hide the origins of his stolen wealth. Wilson again rejects this solution. 
Toosey is killed and the gold retaken by Caislyn, leaving the novel at a dead-end, in a 
graveyard, with the narrator declaring not the possibilities of the young, but the “debt” they 
owe to “those lost” (Lost 295). Melancholia here is both tone and temporality. It marks the 
novels’ rejection of progress, and their affirmation instead that in the settler colony – where 
28 
 
foundational contradictions are a “structure not an event” (Wolfe ‘Structure’ 103) – “time 
does not pass” (Baucom 24), except in the fantasies of those interested in denial. As Baucom 
explains, this melancholic approach works “not only by recalling to memory the violence of 
the imperial past” but, crucially, “by refusing that Hegelian and post-Hegelian model of 
historical time which views this past and its violence as, in fact, past and, so, no longer 
pertinent to a present practice of justice or philosophy of right” (Baucom 305). Nothing could 
be less amenable to settler-colonial ideology and its contemporary apologists. It is in this 
sense that Wilson’s novels are true to the spirit of Lukács, embodying realism without 
replicating European norms. They are non-progressive, materialist, and committed to the 
continuity of past and present – not as successive states, but as interconnected moments of an 
ongoing dispossession. The contrast to Catton’s work, a naturalism that turns in on itself, is 
striking. 
* 
Much more could, of course, be said about these complex novels. One off-putting 
thing about Lukács’ criticism is his tendency to totalize judgements, so that a diagnosis of 
naturalism or realism becomes not just an interpretive claim but a statement of moral worth. 
There is far more to Wilson’s and Catton’s work than covered here. Nonetheless, I believe 
this reading shows that Lukács’ theories continue to have value for the analysis of 
postcolonial literatures, illuminating how the ideological dimensions of settler colonialism 
transform the novel in these contexts. They also offer a framework to differentiate approaches 
to settler-colonial narrative. It is clearly the case that the critical categories I have proposed 
are ideal types; further analysis might benefit from treating them as points upon a spectrum, 
or as aesthetic possibilities that individual works instantiate to greater or lesser degree. It is 
also worth recalling that while the frontier contradiction is what defines settler society, there 
are other important divisions too. Elsewhere I have discussed the importance of gender for 
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settler-colonial narrative (Dalley 70-94), while Veracini emphasises that non-settler migrants 
comprise another essential group (4). 
 What these examples show above all is that settler-colonial realism operates at a 
distance from traditional metropolitan forms without breaking fully from them. Lukács’ error 
was not to suggest that the frontier is part of the history of Europe – for it is undoubtedly a 
crucial site of capitalist modernity – but rather to inscribe that relationship within a linear 
framework that relegated the settler-colonial novel to a primitive phase of literary history. 
Frontier time does not work that way. Settler colonialism is not an early stage of capitalist 
modernity but an ongoing structural relationship, one that is as much part of our present as 
our past. Theories of the novel need to accommodate this truth, and our understanding of 
realism must be able to account for the dislocations of historical consciousness that settler 
colonialism introduces. As such, we need critical approaches that can grapple with temporal 
unevenness in narrating the history of the novel, and thereby do justice to a genre that is at 
once part of modern history and entangled with material and ideological contexts that are 
irreducible to traditional metropolitan-peripheral models. It is on that basis, I argue, that we 
can begin to discuss the meaning of settler realism. 
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